



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

the two peoples in constant unrest and alarm. This is the pity and the mischief of the situation. Unless something can be done speedily for the removal of this cause of recrimination and friction, what hindered the Hague Conference from doing more than it did in some important directions will continue, and the strain between these two great powers will grow worse and worse, in spite of the mutual affection of the rulers.

The conduct of the two rulers, when they were together, was admirable as far as it went, but it was entirely too superficial. The regrettable thing is that to neither of them does it seem to have occurred that it lay in their power to take the initiative in a step which would have rendered to the cause of peace between their countries and throughout the world an infinitely greater service than that of fine speeches and noble official and personal behavior. If Emperor William, for instance, had said to King Edward: "This rivalry of armaments has gone far enough, and I shall be glad to coöperate and to induce my government to coöperate with your Majesty's government in putting an end to it," he might that day have set in motion a current which would have speedily relieved, not Germany and England only, but the whole body of the nations of the curse of military and naval rivalry, which still disturbs and poisons to a greater or less degree all the sources of international friendship and confidence. Why should not one of these "great kings" have seen this golden opportunity?

### **The Mischief of the Big Battle Fleet Cruise.**

The sailing of the fleet of sixteen big battleships for the Pacific has given rise to a great variety of comment. Many persons have looked upon it as nothing more than a somewhat exceptional practice cruise. Some have criticised it as essentially spectacular, as involving a useless waste of money, and as a performance of no essential value, even from the naval point of view. Others have seen in it evidence of an adroit scheme to boom the navy and to secure for it support not likely to come if the ordinary naval routine were preserved. The majority of those who have spoken have commended, or even gloried in, the cruise as a necessary exhibition to the other maritime powers, and particularly to Japan, of our great and rapidly growing naval strength, and as a timely warning to them not to meddle with us from the sea. The sensational papers, which are at the bottom of nearly every bit of international trouble, have made great capital out of it.

From one point of view, the naval cruise performance hardly deserves attention. If our own country only were concerned, it would make very little difference whether our fleet were on the Atlantic or the Pacific coast, or half on one side and half on the

other; whether it went round the Horn, or cruised up and down the Eastern Coast, or made a trip into the Mediterranean. Any reference of the cruise to a special impression to be made upon Japan may also be eliminated from consideration. The declarations of the government on this point are explicit, and we dislike to believe them insincere.

But notwithstanding these reserves, the cruise of this great battle fleet, as the President fondly calls it, seems to us to be extremely unfortunate and fraught with immense mischief. It is perfectly clear what the purpose of the government was in dispatching it. If we are to interpret this purpose by the repeated utterances of the President and the Navy Department about the necessity of a large and efficient navy in the interests both of our own security and of the peace of the world, this cruise was intended, not only to give the combined fleet practice and thus to increase its efficiency, but also to create among the people of the country a deeper interest in the navy and a warmer enthusiasm for its further enlargement according to the Administration's policy. Enlistments for the navy have been very slow and the department doubtless believed that this exhibition would increase the patriotic zeal of a considerable number of young men and induce them to take service with the navy. Nothing could have been more cunningly devised to excite the imaginations of the masses, kindle their fighting patriotism, intensify their fear of imaginary foreign foes, make them feel that a big fleet is absolutely necessary to our safety, and secure their support for immense naval budgets in Congress,—nothing could have been more cunningly devised for all this than this extraordinary and spectacular cruise.

But great as is the mischief that it will work in this direction, in dazzling the people and keeping them blind to the folly and wickedness of limitless naval expansion by our country, the evil effect in another direction will be still greater. The President naïvely supposes, if his utterances are to be taken at their face value, that the other powers will be awed by this naval display into respect for us, and thus the peace of the world be better assured. What will actually happen is that most of the great naval powers will be aroused by the example, or goaded on by a lurking fear of what may be our purposes, to add immediately to its own naval equipment and to try to outdo us in power on the sea. Great Britain, Germany and Japan are not the sort of folk to be stupefied by this display and driven from the field of rivalry. On the contrary, they will all take up the challenge and the cruise will hardly be ended before more huge ships, in addition to the latest recommended by the President, will be urged upon Congress, that we may keep pace with the naval programs of the other powers, which our own folly and extravagance have induced them to form. In this way this great cruise

of our battle fleet to the Pacific will, as its most immediate and certain effect, strengthen and urge on the rivalry of armaments among the nations, which has already done such enormous evil, and which nearly every one of them professes to wish to see arrested.

That our own country should, at any rate on the naval side, be taking the lead in this ruinous rivalry, is one of the incomprehensible contradictions of the time; and so it is regarded by all intelligent people abroad. Our national principles, our historic antecedents, and what we have actually done through arbitration in promoting international good-feeling and peace, all demand that we should be first and not last in every purpose and effort to bring about speedily a limitation and reduction of the overgrown armaments which now burden the world. But instead of this, here we are, cap in hand, shouting with the full strength of our lungs, and rushing at our top speed at the head of the mad race for ever greater and greater naval armament.

Not all of the people, we are glad to say, are being fooled by this great naval pageant, but unfortunately too many of them are.

### Parts of the President's Message.

Those parts of the President's recent Message to Congress which deal with international matters are what might have been expected from him. There is the same fine plea for justice and neighborly behavior towards other countries, to which we have grown accustomed in his speeches and messages; the same fervid commendation of high ideals of international friendship and service. What he says on the work and results of the second Hague Conference could hardly have been more justly or fittingly said. We give it in full on another page, as a most valuable contribution to the interpretation of the meaning and results of that important gathering, which has as yet been so little understood.

One cannot read all this without feeling moved to believe that the President is, after all, one of the most ardent friends of international peace, and that he desires to see the institutions which will assure its permanency developed as speedily as possible. But alongside of this bright clear stream runs the muddy current of his distrust of the supremacy and protective power of moral forces, of his insistence that brute force in army and navy is the only sure dependence of the country for undisturbed quiet and peace, of his gratuitous suspicion that some other nation, or nations, is cherishing dark and deep designs of aggression against us, to whom "we must make it evident that we do not intend to be imposed upon." The important thing internationally to him is for us to keep a "fighting edge" on.

Nearly three newspaper columns of the Message are devoted to the army and the navy. The Presi-

dent insists that this country has not only never suffered from the evils of militarism, but is not "in the remotest danger of suffering" from them; and this in spite of the fact that last year \$122,000,000 was spent on the army and fortifications, and that the naval expenses of the government (now just under \$100,000,000 a year) are at present three times as great as they were ten years ago. He insists ingeniously that the regular army has never in our history "caused the slightest appreciable tax upon the tax-paying citizens of the nation." But he forgets to note that at the present time the people of the nation are paying about \$12 per family of five persons to support the navy, the army and fortifications, to say nothing of what goes to pensions. Is \$12 per family, the average family of the nation, with its small income, no appreciable tax? We might counteract the evils of industrialism, which he compares unfavorably with those of militarism, much more effectually than we do, if we had even half of the \$12 per family with which to work.

In substance, indeed almost in definite terms, the President pleads for a larger regular army; and this, not because there is any conceivable present need of more regular soldiers, or even half of those now in the army, but solely that the nation may be prepared to "meet any immediate need" brought upon us by some great war which his vivid imagination seems to be always picturing as sure speedily to fall upon us.

The President deplores the alarming rate of desertion from the army, and declares that the deserters should be treated by public opinion as guilty of the greatest crime. But he gives no hint of the real ground of this frequent desertion, which everybody who has looked into the subject knows perfectly well. It is two-fold: the general growing dislike of war and preparations for it, and the utter moral disagreeableness of the service to many men, who have been enticed into it by flaming delusive advertisements, when they come to learn what it really is. Raising the pay of the men will not stop the desertions.

The following sentence is amazing: "After twelve years of service in the army (or the navy) my own belief is that the man should be given a preference, according to his ability, for certain types of office, *over all civilian applicants*, without examination." To such an extent does the President exalt military service over all civilian service as a preparation for official position!

The failure of the Hague Conference to reach any agreement as to limitation of armaments, instead of inducing the President to redouble the efforts of our government to make such an agreement possible, has drawn from him the strange and altogether premature conclusion that "it is folly for this nation to base any hope of securing peace on any international agreement as to the limitation of armaments." He therefore urges, with his usual fervidness of rhetoric, that